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Abstract
Current programming models only provide abstractions for sharing data un-
der a homogeneous consistency model. It is, however, not uncommon for a
distributed application to provide strong consistency for one part of the shared
data and eventual consistency for another part. Because mixing consistency
models is not supported by current programming models, writing such appli-
cations is extremely difficult. In this paper we propose CScript, a distributed
object-oriented programming language with built-in support for data replica-
tion. At its core are consistent and available replicated objects. CScript regu-
lates the interactions between these objects to avoid subtle inconsistencies that
arise when mixing consistency models. Our evaluation compares a collabora-
tive text editor built atop CScript with a state-of-the-art implementation. The
results show that our approach is flexible and more memory efficient.
Keywords: Distribution, Consistency models, Replicated data types
1. Introduction
According to the CAP theorem [1] a distributed system cannot remain both
available and consistent under network partitions. This forces programmers
to choose between availability (AP) and consistency (CP) in the event of a
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partition. This choice can be made for each piece of shared data [2]. We5
call applications that share multiple pieces of data with different guarantees
mixed-consistency applications. When developing such applications, program-
mers face two major problems. First, distributed programming languages lack
abstractions to share data under AP/CP guarantees. This forces programmers
to manually synchronise replicas. As a result, programmers often make mistakes10
against consistency models [3]. Second, many AP approaches such as [4, 5, 6]
develop common data types with hardcoded conflict resolution semantics. Un-
fortunately, programmers cannot compose these data types to design custom
ones. Going beyond the current portfolio of available replicated data types
(RDTs) requires programmers to manually engineer the RDT using ad hoc con-15
flict resolution strategies. This has shown to be error-prone and results in brittle
systems [6, 7, 8].
To help programmers develop mixed-consistency applications, we argue that
distributed programming languages should have (1) built-in RDTs for writing
AP and CP functionality and (2) built-in defense mechanisms that prevent pro-20
grammers from making mistakes when mixing data with different consistency
guarantees. In this paper, we propose CScript, a novel distributed programming
language with native support for availability and consistency. CScript extends
JavaScript with first-class replicas and services. Replicas are objects that en-
code their availability and consistency guarantees, and can be composed into25
services which are distributed over the network. CScript supports two families
of AP replicated data types guaranteeing strong eventual consistency [6] (SEC):
conflict-free replicated data types [6] (CRDTs) and strong eventually consistent
replicated objects [9] (SECROs). CRDTs are a subset of the RDTs for which
all operations commute. SECROs use semantic information provided by the30
programmer to reorder conflicting operations such that they do not need to
commute. This approach is based on the idea that conflict detection and res-
olution naturally depends on the semantics of the application [10]. When the
operations of an RDT do not commute and conflicts can be solved by reorder-
ing operations, CScript programmers can use SECROs to build the RDT. All35
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replicas of this RDT are guaranteed to converge to the same state.
This paper complements our previous exposition of SECROs in [9] by proving
convergence and showing that progress depends on the data type itself. Hence,
we formulate a necessary condition for SECRO data types which enables us to
give a general proof of progress.40
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses
related work that is necessary to understand this paper. Section 3 introduces
our motivating example for mixed-consistency. Section 4 describes CScript’s
architecture and programming model. Section 5 describes our novel SECRO
data type which is part of CScript. We then work out our motivating exam-45
ple in Section 6 using CScript. Section 8 evaluates CScript by benchmarking
a collaborative text editing application. Finally, we discuss related work in
Section 10 and close with final conclusions in Section 11.
2. Background
In this section we introduce background knowledge on the CAP theorem, its50
implications, and the consistency models on which the paper builds.
The CAP theorem [1, 11] describes the interactions between consistency (C),
availability (A) and partition tolerance (P) in a distributed system consisting of
nodes that can write to a conceptually shared memory. A system is consistent
if all reads return the latest write. A system is available when all nodes are55
able to read from and write to the shared memory at any point in time. The
system is partition tolerant if it is able to maintain its consistency or availability
guarantees in the face of network partitions. The CAP theorem proves that a
distributed system cannot remain both available and consistent under network
partitions. This led to a multitude of consistency models (mainly weak consis-60
tency models 1) being developed [12]. Eventual consistency [13] for instance,
states that when updates stop, all replicas will eventually converge to the same
1Consistency models weaker than sequential consistency.
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state.
Strong eventual consistency (SEC) [6] is a variation on eventual consis-
tency [13] that imposes an additional strong convergence requirement: correct65
replicas that received the same updates (possibly in a different order) must
be in the same state. Strong convergence thus defines when replicas converge,
something that is not specified by traditional eventual consistency.
Today’s only implementation of the SEC model is the conflict-free replicated
data type (CRDT) [6]. CRDTs come in two flavours which have been proven70
equivalent: state-based CRDTs (abbreviated CvRDTs) and operation-based
CRDTs (abbreviated CmRDTs). CvRDTs require replicated state to form a
join-semilattice. As such, two states can always be merged deterministically by
computing their least upper bound. On the other hand, CmRDTs require all
operations to commute and as such guarantee strong convergence by design.75
Imposing all operations to commute (or the equivalent requirement for state
to form a join-semilattice) hurts the applicability of CRDTs. For this reason the
literature describes only a limited portfolio of CRDTs. Furthermore, CRDTs
cannot be composed out of the box. Some research [8, 14] seeks to improve the
composability of CRDTs, however, none of these composition mechanisms is80
general enough to allow arbitrary compositions for all CRDTs. JSON CRDTs [8]
for instance only let programmers compose linked lists and maps. Hence, pro-
grammers often need to engineer their own CRDTs from scratch (if possible)
or rely on manual conflict resolution which is error-prone and results in brittle
systems [6, 7, 8].85
3. Motivation: A Mixed-Consistency Application
This section introduces a grocery list application which acts as a motivating
example of mixed-consistency throughout this paper. Users of the application
can create shared grocery lists to which they can add and delete items. Users
can also request more pieces of an item or mark a certain quantity of an item90
as bought.
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The application must meet the following consistency requirements:
Automatic Sharing Grocery lists are shared between all users. When a user
creates a new grocery list, other users must automatically see that list.
Consistent Purchases Users should not be able to concurrently mark the95
same item as bought, i.e. purchases must happen consistently.
Offline Availability Users should be able to add, delete or update items of a
grocery list, even while being offline. Updating a shared grocery list while
being offline causes the list to diverge from the other replicas. The system
must solve state inconsistencies when the user comes back online.100
Note that the application requires multiple consistency levels. The grocery
list itself is eventually consistent but marking items as bought is strongly con-
sistent. Sometimes both levels interact, e.g. when purchasing an item we first
try to mark it as bought and then update the grocery list.
Implementing this application is difficult because it not only requires pro-105
grammers to implement the application logic but also to deal with aspects of
distribution such as implementing service discovery, serialising objects, and im-
plementing different consistency models to keep copies consistent. We argue
that a language with appropriate replication mechanisms and built-in consis-
tency models, can avoid this accidental complexity by hiding it in the language.110
As a result, programmers can focus on the application logic.
4. CScript
We now introduce CScript, our JavaScript extension for mixed-consistency
applications. First, we provide a high-level description of CScript and describe
the typical architecture of CScript applications. Afterwards, we introduce the115
building blocks of CScript’s programming model.
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4.1. Architecture
CScript is designed as a JavaScript library with dedicated syntax by means
of macros [15]. When using the dedicated syntax an additional transpilation
step is required to transform CScript into JavaScript (ECMAScript 6). The120
















Figure 1: Architecture of a typical CScript application with three users. Each user runs an
instance of the application which consists of a CScript instance and a user interface.
Figure 1 shows the typical architecture of CScript applications. Users of
the application run a CScript instance and possibly a user interface displaying
the application’s state. CScript instances running on the same local network
are interconnected and form a full-mesh peer-to-peer network (dotted lines).125
Apart from the CScript instances there is no additional infrastructure, i.e. no
centralised servers. All network communication is managed by the CScript
runtime.
4.2. Programming Model
We now describe CScript’s programming model which is centered around130
the concepts of replicas and services. We then illustrate how these concepts
facilitate the development of collaborative mixed-consistency applications.
4.2.1. Replicas
CScript introduces first-class replicated objects, called replicas. Like regular
















+ buy(item, quantity): void
subscribe to "Grocery"
subscribe to "Grocery"
















+ buy(item, quantity): void
publish       as "Grocery"
(b) User A publishes a service under the
“Grocery” topic. User C automatically
discovers the service and acquires a copy.
Figure 2: Exchanging a GroceryService containing two replicas (list and inventory) between
CScript instances.
of methods. State can be primitive data or JavaScript objects. Programmers
can invoke methods of a replica but cannot access state directly. The state of a
replica is automatically kept consistent by its consistency model.
CScript supports two types of replicas: available and consistent replicas. The
former guarantee SEC [6] and thus favor availability over consistency. The latter140
guarantee sequential consistency [17] and thus favor correctness over availability.
4.2.2. Services
When building mixed-consistency applications, replicas alone are not enough.
Programmers need a way to compose replicas - possibly with different consis-
tency guarantees - into a bigger unit that provides specific functionality. To this145
end, CScript provides first-class services.
Services encapsulate state (primitive data, objects, and replicas) and imple-
ment some methods which form the service’s API. The methods use the state
and coordinate between the replicas to provide specific functionality. Program-
mers must use the service’s API as they cannot access a service’s state directly.150
4.2.3. Publications and Subscriptions
CScript lets programmers implement replicas and bundle them into services.
To share services between instances of an application running of different de-
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vices, CScript features a topic-based publish-subscribe mechanism [18]. This
mechanism lets application instances share services with one another without155
knowing each other beforehand, making the underlying network transparent to
the application. Figure 2 shows how CScript instances can publish services on
the network and discover published services. When one instance discovers a
service published by another instance, it acquires a copy of the service. The
replicas encapsulated by the service are automatically managed by the CScript160
runtime such that they uphold their consistency guarantees.
4.2.4. The Interplay Between Consistent and Available Replicas
Mixed-consistency applications share several pieces of data with different
consistency guarantees. When building such applications, programmers must be
careful not to break these guarantees. Ideally, the programming model enforces165
consistency models using a strict set of rules:
1. Each replica implements one specific consistency model.
2. Programmers can only interact with replicas through their public interface,
i.e. programmers cannot access or modify a replica’s internal state directly.
3. Replicas are self-contained since they are replicated over the network.170
4. Replicas may not leak references to their internal state as this would allow
programmers to access internal state directly, thereby breaking rule 2.
5. Data that is replicated under a certain consistency model should not flow
to replicas that enforce a stronger consistency model as it would break the
stronger guarantees.175
We now discuss how CScript enforces the aforementioned rules. Even though
CScript provides consistent and available replicas, programmers can only nest
replicas that guarantee the same level of consistency. Otherwise, one replica
could provide different (possibly conflicting) consistency levels, thereby breaking
rule 1. Hence, consistent replicas may embed other consistent replicas but not180
available replicas, and vice-versa. Replicas are black boxes and do not allow
programmers to access or modify internal state directly (rule 2).
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CScript deep copies the arguments that are passed to the methods of replicas
as well as the return values. Deep copying the arguments ensures that the replica
remains self-contained (rule 3). Deep copying the return value avoids leaking185
references to internal state (rule 4).
Regarding data flows (rule 5), CScript does not yet prohibit data obtained
from available replicas to be passed as argument to a method of a consistent
replica. We foresee a statically typed version of the CScript language that
encodes the consistency model of data as part of its type and rejects illegal190
information flows at compile time.
5. Strong Eventually Consistent Replicated Objects (SECROs)
We now focus on CScript’s support for available replicas: strong eventu-
ally consistent replicated objects (SECROs), a novel RDT that addresses the
applicability issues of CRDTs discussed in Section 2. SECROs use semantic195
information provided by the programmer to guarantee SEC without requiring
operations to commute. This makes SECROs generally applicable.
5.1. SECRO data type
Like regular objects, SECROs contain state in the form of fields, and be-
haviour in the form of methods. The methods define the SECRO’s public in-200
terface which cannot be circumvented. Methods can be further categorised in
accessors (i.e. methods querying internal state) and mutators (i.e. methods
updating the internal state).
SECROs differ from regular objects in that programmers can enforce
application-specific invariants by associating concurrent preconditions and post-205
conditions to the mutators. We say that pre and postconditions are state val-
idators. State validators are used by the SECRO to order concurrent operations
in a way that does not violate any invariant.
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5.2. State Validators
State validators associate rules to mutators. Those rules express invariants210
over the state of the object which need to uphold in the presence of concurrent
operations 2. Behind the scenes, SECRO’s replication protocol may interleave
concurrent operations. From the programmer’s perspective the only guarantee
is that these invariants are upheld. State validators come in two forms:
Preconditions specify invariants that must hold prior to the execution of their215
associated operation. As such, preconditions approve or reject the state
before applying the actual update. In case of a rejection, the operation is
aborted and a different ordering of the operations will be tried.
Postconditions specify invariants that must hold after the execution of their
associated operation. A postcondition does not execute immediately after220
applying an operation. Instead, it executes after all concurrent operations
complete. As such, postconditions approve or reject the state that results
from a group of concurrent, potentially conflicting operations. In case of
a rejection a different ordering of the operations is tried.
5.3. SECRO’s Replication Protocol in a Nutshell225
Recall that SECROs guarantee SEC (eventual consistency and strong con-
vergence). To provide this guarantee SECROs implement a dedicated optimistic
replication protocol. We now briefly discuss this protocol, a detailed explanation
including pseudo code is given in Section 7.
SECRO’s replication protocol asynchronously propagates update operations230
to all replicas. In contrast to CRDTs, the operations of a SECRO do not neces-
sarily commute. Therefore, the replication protocol totally orders the operations
at all replicas. This order respects causality and all pre and postconditions.
Replicas maintain their initial state and a sequence of operations called the
operation history. Each time a replica receives an operation, it is added to the235
2From now on, we use the terms operation and mutator interchangeably, as well as the
terms update and mutation.
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replica’s history, which may require reordering parts of the history. Reordering
the history boils down to finding an ordering of the operations that fulfils two
requirements. First, the order must respect the causality of operations. Second,
applying all the operations in the given order may not violate any of the con-
current pre or postconditions. An ordering which adheres to these requirements240
is called a valid execution. As soon as a valid execution is found each replica
resets its state to the initial one and executes the operations in-order. Reorder-
ing the history is a deterministic process, hence, replicas that received the same
operations find the same valid execution.
Note that the existence of a valid execution cannot be guaranteed for ar-245
bitrary pre and postconditions. It is the programmer’s responsibility to define
correct ones. However, the replication protocol guarantees that:
1. Eventually, all replicas converge towards the same valid execution (i.e.
eventual consistency).
2. Replicas that received the same updates have identical operation histories250
(i.e. strong convergence).
3. Replicas eventually perform the operations of a valid execution if one
exists, or issue an error if none exists.
As users perform operations, the operation histories of replicas may grow
unboundedly. To alleviate this issue we allow a replica’s state to be commit-255
ted periodically. Concretely, replicas maintain a version number. Whenever a
replica is committed, it clears its operation history and increments its version
number. The replication protocol then notifies all other replicas of this commit,
which adopt the committed state and also empty their operation history. As
we explain in Section 7.1, the commit operation does not require synchronising260
the replicas and thus does not affect the system’s availability.
11
6. CScript From the Programmer’s Perspective
We now illustrate CScript’s programming model by implementing a grocery
application that fulfils the requirements outlined in Section 3.
6.1. The Grocery Service265
We model the grocery application as a CScript service, which is shown
in Listing 1. On Line 1 we define the GroceryService using the service key-
word. Similarly to class definitions in ES6 3, services have a constructor method
to initialise the service (Lines 4 to 7). The GroceryService’s constructor defines
two fields: the grocery list’s name and author (Lines 5 and 6). Additionally,270
the service encapsulates two replicas, groceryList and inventory, which are
defined using the rep keyword (Lines 2 and 3). The former is the grocery
list (an available replica) whereas the latter is the inventory containing all the
items marked as bought (a consistent replica). Syntactically there is no differ-
ence between the eventually consistent groceryList replica and the sequentially275
consistent inventory replica because the consistency guarantees depend on the
type of the replica. Finally, the service defines functionality to add, delete, and
buy grocery items. This functionality is exposed through the GroceryService’s
API which consists of the add, delete, and buy methods (Lines 8 to 14). The
implementation of the buy method is discussed in Section 6.2.280
1 service GroceryService {
2 rep groceryList = new GroceryList ();
3 rep inventory = new Inventory ();
4 constructor(name , author)
5 this.name = name;285








12 return this.groceryList.delete(itemName );
13 }
14 buy(itemName , buyingQuantity) { /* ... */ }
15 }295
Listing 1: Implementation of the grocery service.
6.2. The Sequentially Consistent Inventory of Purchases
Listing 2 shows the implementation of the Inventory class, which keeps a
map to track how many pieces of each item were marked as bought (Line 3),
this is called the “stock”. The inventory defines an approve method which is
called before marking a certain quantity of an item as bought (Lines 5 to 15).300
This method first checks that the user’s view on the stock is equal to the actual
stock for that item (Lines 8 and 9), thereby rejecting concurrent purchases of
the same item. If the check succeeds, the inventory approves the buy request
and updates its stock for that item (Lines 10 and 11).
1 class Inventory {305
2 constructor(stock = []) {
3 this.stock = new Map(stock);
4 }
5 approve(itemName , stockQuantity , buyingQuantity) {
6 if (buyingQuantity <= 0)310
7 return false;
8 const trueStock = this.stock.getOrElse(itemName , 0);
9 if (trueStock === stockQuantity) {





15 } } }
Listing 2: Implementation of the grocery service’s inventory.
By default, CScript replicas are sequentially consistent unless the data type320
implements SEC. CScript guarantees sequential consistency by serialising all
operations on a single (remote) copy of the replica which resides at the creator of
13
(a) Peer 1 discovers a con-
sistent replica at peer 2.
(b) Peer 2 passes the con-
sistent replica to peer 1 by
far reference [19].
(c) Peer 1 holds a far ref-
erence to a remote object
living at peer 2.
Figure 3: How to exchange consistent replicas and interact with them.
the (grocery) service, as depicted in Figure 3. This means that there is no central
server hosting the inventory, instead, the inventory is hosted by the device that
created it. Interactions with consistent replicas may therefore involve network325
communication. For this reason, property accesses and method invocations on
consistent replicas are asynchronous and return a promise.
1 buy(itemName , buyingQuantity) {
2 return new Promise ((resolve , reject) => {
3 const stockQuantity = this.groceryList.get(itemName ). bought;330
4 this.inventory
5 .then(inventory => {
6 return inventory.approve(itemName , stockQuantity , buyingQuantity)
7 }). then(accepted => {
8 if (accepted) {335









Listing 3: Buying a certain quantity of a grocery item.
Listing 3 shows the implementation of the grocery service’s buy method.345
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The method first fetches the user’s local view on the stock from the eventu-
ally consistent grocery list, which may thus be outdated (Line 3). Then, it
asynchronously sends a request to the inventory by calling the approve method
(Line 6). If the request is approved, it informs the local grocery list replica
(Line 9) which then marks the given quantity of that item as bought in the UI.350
This method shows that services may have to interact with replicas that exhibit
different consistency guarantees in order to provide the required functionality.
6.3. The Eventually Consistent Grocery List
We now discuss the implementation of the GroceryList, which is an avail-
able replica providing functionality to fetch the items of a list, add items to a list,355
and mark (a certain quantity of) items as bought. To this end, we implemented
the grocery list using our SECRO data type, presented in Section 5.
Listing 4 shows the implementation of the GroceryList which extends the
SECRO interface. Its public interface consists of one accessor (get) and three
mutators: add, bought, and delete. It also associates a precondition to the360
bought method and a postcondition to the add method, using the pre and
post keywords respectively (Lines 14 and 15). The side-effect free method get
is annotated with @accessor, otherwise, CScript treats it as a mutator 4. The
tojson and fromjson methods serve to (de)serialise the object as it will be
replicated over the network. In order for the receiver to know the GroceryList365
class, this SECRO must be registered at the CScript factory (Line 20).
1 class GroceryList extends SECRO {
2 constructor(items = []) {
3 super ();




8 get() { /* ... */ }
9 // operations to manipulate the list375
4When a mutator is invoked, the operation is propagated to all replicas.
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10 add(item) { /* ... */ }
11 bought(itemName , quantity) { /* ... */ }
12 delete(itemName) { /* ... */ }
13 // SECRO’s state validators
14 post add(originalState , state , args , res) { /* ... */ }380
15 pre bought(state , args) { /* ... */ }
16 // serialisation methods
17 tojson () { /* ... */ }
18 static fromjson(items) { /* ... */ }
19 }385
20 Factory.registerAvailableType(GroceryList );
Listing 4: Structure of the grocery list.
Lets now take a look at the implementation of the add, bought, and delete
mutators and their associated pre and postconditions.
1 add(item) {
2 const description =
3 this.items.getOrElse(item.name , {requested: 0, bought: 0});
4 description.requested += item.requested;
5 this.items.set(item.name , description );
6 }
7 post add(originalState , state , args , res) {
8 const [item] = args ,
9 addedQuantity = item.requested ,
10 resultingQuantity =
11 state.items.getOrElse(item.name , 0). requested;
12 return resultingQuantity >= addedQuantity;
13 }
Listing 5: Adding items to a grocery list.
Listing 5 shows the implementation of the add method (which adds a certain390
quantity of an item to the grocery list) and its associated postcondition. First,
add fetches the item from the grocery list in case it already exists, or, creates
a new item description otherwise (Line 3). Then, it increments the requested
quantity (Line 4) and updates the item’s description in the underlying map
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(Line 5). add’s postcondition 5 states that the resulting state must reflect at395
least the quantity requested by the operation. While this invariant always holds
in a sequential system, it may be violated when operations run concurrently, e.g.
due to a concurrent delete of the same item. By stating this invariant explicitly,
the SECRO will ensure add-wins semantics.
1 bought(itemName , quantity) {400
2 const quantities = this.items.get(itemName );





8 pre bought(state , args) {
9 const [itemName , quantity] = args;
10 return this.items.has(itemName );
11 }410
Listing 6: Marking items as bought and deleting items from the grocery list.
Listing 6 shows the bought and delete methods. bought fetches the item’s
description (Line 2) and increments it with the bought quantity (Line 3). delete
removes the item from the underlying list (Line 6). On Lines 8 to 11 we associate
a precondition 6 to the bought method which checks that the item exists. We
associate no postcondition to delete (only to add) because we expect adds to415
win over deletes, as shown in Figure 4.
Having discussed the implementation of the add, bought, and delete op-
erations, we now describe which operations can be generated by the users in a
5Postconditions receive four arguments: the state before applying the operation, the state
after applying all concurrent operations, the operation’s arguments and return value.
6Preconditions receive the state before applying the operation and the arguments.
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mangos: {requested: 5, bought: 3}
lasagna: {requested: 2, bought: 0}
add( {item: "lasagna",
requested: 1} ) mangos: {requested: 5, bought: 3}
lasagna: {requested: 3, bought: 0}
mangos: {requested: 5, bought: 3}







mangos: {requested: 5, bought: 3}
lasagna: {requested: 2, bought: 0}
mangos: {requested: 5, bought: 3}
lasagna: {requested: 1, bought: 0}
delete("lasagna")
mangos: {requested: 5, bought: 3}
Figure 4: Alice adds one lasagna while concurrently Bob deletes the lasagnas from the grocery
list. After propagating the operations the resulting list contains one lasagna because Bob was
not aware of Alice’s addition at the time of his deletion.
given state s. We call this the set of valid updates and denote it Vs.
item = 〈name, req, bought〉 name ∈ String req ∈ N+ bought ∈ N0
add(item) ∈ Vs
(1)
〈name, , 〉 ∈ s qty ∈ N+
bought(name, qty) ∈ Vs
(2)
〈name, , 〉 ∈ s
delete(name) ∈ Vs
(3)
The first rule states that users can always add well-formed items to the grocery
list, independent of the application’s state. The second rule states that users
can only buy a positive quantity of an existing item. The third rule states that
users can only delete existing items.420
6.4. Sharing Grocery Services Between Users
Users of our grocery application can create new grocery lists at will. Each
grocery list must be shared between all instances (users) of the grocery appli-
cation. To this end, we use CScript’s publish-subscribe mechanism.
Every time the user creates a new grocery list the createGrocery function425
from Listing 7 is invoked. This function first creates a grocery service represent-
ing the list (Line 3), then publishes the newly created service under the Grocery
type tag using the publish <service> as <typetag> construct (Line 4). The
typetag is the topic of publication and is defined using the deftype keyword
on Line 1. Afterwards, the function calls processService which installs the430
necessary callbacks on the service, such that the application can react to incom-
ing updates, e.g. when another user adds an item to the shared grocery list.
Reacting to updates will be discussed further in this section.
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1 deftype Grocery
2 function createGrocery(name , author) {435
3 const gservice = new GroceryService(name , author );




Listing 7: Exporting grocery services on the network.
Listing 8 shows how to subscribe to services of the Grocery type using
the subscribe <typetag> with <callback> construct (Line 2). The provided
callback is parametrised with the discovered service. Upon discovering a service,
CScript invokes the callback, which in this case fetches the service’s name and
author (Lines 3 and 4) and creates a unique identifier for the service (Line 5).445
The callback then stores the discovered service in a map, on Line 6. Note
that the name and author fields contain regular objects. When discovering the
service the application acquires a deep-copy of those fields (which contrary to
replicas are not kept consistent).
1 const services = new Map ();450
2 subscribe Grocery with gservice => {
3 const name = gservice.name ,
4 author = gservice.author ,
5 id = ‘${name} by ${author}‘;
6 services.set(id, gservice );455
7 processService(gservice );
8 }
Listing 8: Subscribing to grocery services.
In order to make services self-contained, they do not have access to enclosing
lexical scopes, much like isolates in AmbientTalk [19] or spores in Scala [20].
6.4.1. Reacting to Updates of the Grocery List460
When a user modifies a shared grocery list all replicas will eventually observe
the update and in turn update the user interface. To this end, CScript replicas
emit two events to which applications can react: RemoteUpdate and Update.
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The former is triggered when a replica receives an update from a remote replica.




















Figure 5: Sequence diagram illustrating updates of the grocery application.
Figure 5 shows how updates are propagated between two users. Alice adds
an item to her grocery list (m1) and the operation is sent to bob (m2). Up-
date events are triggered on both devices (m3 and m7) which causes the user
interfaces to be refreshed (m4, m5 and m8, m9).
7. SECRO’s Replication Protocol470
Having introduced the CScript language and our SECRO data type, we now
turn our attention to the replication algorithm behind SECROs. The detailed
algorithm is explained in [9]. This paper provides the correctness proofs and
presents only the parts of the algorithm that are relevant to the proofs.
7.1. Algorithm475
The algorithm described in this section assumes a reliable causal order broad-
casting mechanism without loss of generality, i.e. a communication medium in
which messages arrive in an order that is consistent with the happened-before
relation [21]. It also assumes that reading the state of a replica happens side-
effect free and that mutators solely affect the replica’s state (i.e. the side effects480
are confined to the replica itself).
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A SECRO replica r is a tuple 〈vi , s0 , si , h, idc〉 consisting of the replica’s
version number vi , its initial state s0 , its current state si , its operation history
h, and the globally unique identifier of the latest commit operation idc . Reading
the value of the replica simply returns its latest local state si . A mutator m is485
represented as a tuple 〈o, p, a〉 consisting of the update operation o, precondition
p, and postcondition a. When a mutator is applied to a replica a mutate message
is broadcast to all replicas. Such a message is an extension of the mutator
〈o, args, p, a, c, id〉 which additionally contains the arguments args passed to the
operation o, the node’s logical clock time c, and a globally unique identifier id.490
We denote that a mutation m1 happened before m2 using m1 ≺ m2 . Similarly,
we denote that two mutations happened concurrently using m1 ‖m2 . Both
relations are based on the clocks carried by the mutate messages [22].
Algorithm 1 governs the replicas’ behaviour to guarantee SEC by ensuring
that all replicas execute operations in the same order. In particular, algorithm 1495
delivers a list of mutate messages l to a replica r which optionally returns the
updated replica r′, denoted l ⇓ r = Some r′ or l ⇓ r = None. The algorithm
consists of two parts. First, it appends the list of mutate messages to the oper-
ation history, sorts the history according to the >> total order, and generates
all linear extensions of the replica’s sorted history (see Lines 1 and 3). We500
say that m1 = 〈o1 , args1 , p1 , a1 , c1 , id1 〉 >> m2 = 〈o2 , args2 , p2 , a2 , c2 , id2 〉 iff
id1 > id2, however, this could be any total order. The generated linear exten-
sions are all the permutations of h ′ that respect the partial order defined by the
operations’ causal relations. Since replicas deterministically compute linear ex-
tensions and start from the same sorted operation history, all replicas generate505
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the same sequence of permutations.
ALGORITHM 1: Handling mutate messages
arguments: A list of mutate messages l, a replica r = 〈vi , s0 , si , h, idc〉
1 h′ = h ++ l
2 s′i = si
3 for ops ∈ LE(sort>>(h′)) do
4 si = copy(s
′
i) // Restore the replica’s state
5 pre = 0
6 post = 0
7 for m ∈ ops do
8 concurrentClosure = TC(m,h′) ∪ {m}
9 ogStates = Map()
10 retVals = Map()
11 for 〈o, args, p, a, c, id〉 ∈ concurrentClosure do
12 if p(si, args) then
13 pre += 1
14 ogStates.put(id, copy(si)) // copy state to pass to postcondition
15 retVals.put(id, o(args)) // o’s side-effects mutate si
16 end
17 end
18 for 〈o, args, p, a, c, id〉 ∈ concurrentClosure do
19 ogState = ogStates.get(id)
20 retVal = retVals.get(id)
21 if a(ogState, si, args, retVal) then
22 post += 1
23 end
24 end
25 ops = ops \ concurrentClosure
26 end
27 if pre == |ops| ∧ post == |ops| then





Second, the algorithm searches for the first valid permutation. For each op-
eration within such a permutation it computes the transitive closure of concur-
rent operations 7 and checks that their pre (Lines 11 to 17) and postconditions510
7The transitive closure of a mutate message m with respect to an operation history h is
denoted TC(m,h) and is the set of all operations that are directly or transitively concurrent
with m, including m itself. A formal definition is provided in Appendix C.
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(Lines 18 to 24) hold. Postconditions are checked only after all concurrent op-
erations of the transitive closure executed since they happened independently
and may thus conflict. The algorithm returns the replica’s updated state as
soon as a valid execution is found, l ⇓ r = Some 〈vi, s0, s′i, h′, idc〉. If no valid
execution exists the algorithm fails, l ⇓ r = None.515
Besides reading and mutating replicas, it is possible to commit a replica.
Commit clears the replica’s operation history h, increments the replica’s version
and replaces the initial state s0 by the current state si . This avoids unbounded
growth of operation histories, but operations concurrent with the commit will
be discarded 8. Commit operations commute in order not to compromise avail-520
ability. The detailed commit algorithm and its explanation can be found in [9].
7.2. Convergence and Progress Properties
As mentioned before, SECROs guarantee strong eventual consistency (SEC).
This means that the replication algorithm ensures two properties: strong con-
vergence and progress [6]. The former states that replicas which received the525
same operations must be in equivalent states. The latter states that if some
replica generates a valid operation, applying that operation on another replica
may not lead to an error state [23].
The SECRO algorithm guarantees strong convergence by deterministically
reordering the operations at all replicas. Recall from the previous section that530
all replicas execute all operations in the same order and thus converge to the
same state. Appendix A provides the complete proof of convergence.
The main advantage of SECROs over CRDTs lies in the fact that it is a
general-purpose RDT. Programmers explicitly specify preconditions and post-
conditions that constrain the data type’s behaviour under concurrent operations.535
Depending on these pre and postconditions a replica may or may not end up in
8Since commit may drop operations, one can argue that SECROs are similar to last-writer-
wins (LWW) strategies. However, SECROs guarantee invariant preservation, which is not the
case with CRDTs.
23
an error state. Hence, we cannot provide a general proof of progress that holds
for all SECROs. Instead, we require the SECRO’s pre and postconditions to
accept at least one causal serialization 9 of the operations (see Lemma 1).
Lemma 1. Given an initial state s and a set of valid updates Vs
10, there exists540
an ordering of the updates that respects causality and all pre and postconditions.
Appendix B provides a proof that SECROs whose pre and postconditions
meet Lemma 1 guarantee progress. It is up to the programmer to prove Lemma 1
when designing custom SECROs.
8. Evaluation545
To evaluate CScript we built several applications, including the grocery list
application and a collaborative text editing application. The text editor is built
on top of SECROs, one of CScript’s core abstractions, which makes the applica-
tion highly available and partition tolerant (AP). We compare the application to
a state-of-the-art implementation on top of JSON CRDTs [8]. To this end, we550
perform various experiments which quantify the memory usage and execution
time of both implementations.
JSON CRDTs are closely related to SECROs because they allow program-
mers to build custom CRDTs by nesting linked lists and maps, without having
to worry about conflicts. However, the extensibility of JSON CRDTs is lim-555
ited to the composition of lists and maps, and conflict resolution cannot be
customised because it is hardcoded by the implementation of lists and maps.
Note that SECROs are designed to ease the development of custom RDTs
guaranteeing SEC. Hence, our goal is not to outperform JSON CRDTs, but
rather to evaluate the practical feasibility of SECROs. The results show that560
9An ordering of the operations that respects the causality of the operations.
10The set of valid updates Vs is defined as the set of all updates that can be generated by
the application while being in state s.
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SECROs are memory efficient but induce a linear time overhead on top of the
operations. Overall, SECROs can be made practical by committing regularly.
8.1. A Text Editing Application
The collaborative text editor lets users share text documents and work on
them simultaneously. A naive version of this application stores text documents565
as a linked list of characters. An improvement would be to store documents as
a balanced tree of characters, allowing for logarithmic time lookups, insertions,
and deletions. We implemented both versions of the text editor using SECROs
in CScript. The tree version uses a third party AVL tree and extends it with
pre and postconditions to turn it into a SECRO that can freely be replicated.570
The implementation is publicly available at [24] and is detailed in [9].
Since JSON CRDTs only let programmers nest linked lists and maps, it is
not possible to implement a balanced tree data structure. Hence, using JSON
CRDTs we were only able to implement the naive version of the text editor.
We compare to JSON CRDTs because they are designed to build custom575
CRDTs and are thus similar to SECROs which are meant to build custom
RDTs. We did not compare CScript to other languages because performance
benchmarks would be biased by the language.
8.2. Methodology
All experiments presented in this section were performed on a cluster consisting580
of 10 worker nodes which are interconnected through a 10 Gbit twinax connec-
tion. Each worker node has an Intel Xeon E3-1240 processor at 3.50 GHz and
32 GB of RAM. Depending on the experiment, the benchmark is either run on
a single worker node or on all ten nodes. We specify this for each benchmark.
To get statistically sound results we repeat each benchmark at least 30 times,585
yielding a minimum of 30 samples per measurement. Each benchmark starts
with a number of warmup rounds to minimise the effects of program initialisa-
tion. We also disable NodeJS’ just-in-time compiler optimisations.
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We perform statistical analysis over our measurements as follows. We dis-
card samples that are affected by garbage collection (e.g. the execution time590
benchmarks). For each measurement comprising at least 30 samples we compute
the average value and the corresponding 95% confidence interval.
8.3. Memory Usage
To compare the memory usage of the SECRO and JSON CRDT text editors,
we perform an experiment in which 1000 operations are executed on each text595
editor. We continuously alternate between 100 character insertions followed
by deletions of those 100 characters. We force garbage collection after each
operation 11, and measure the heap usage. Figure 6 shows the results. Green
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(b) Memory usage of the list and tree im-
plementations of the SECRO text editor.
Figure 6: Memory usage benchmarks. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval for
the average taken from 30 samples. The experiments are performed on a single worker node.
Figure 6a confirms our expectation that the SECRO implementations are600
more memory efficient than the JSON CRDT one. The memory usage of the
JSON CRDT text editor grows unbounded since CRDTs cannot delete charac-
11Forcing garbage collection is needed to get the real-time memory usage. Otherwise, the
memory usage keeps growing until garbage collection is triggered.
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ters but merely mark them as deleted using tombstones 12. Conversely, SECROs
support true deletions by reorganising concurrent operations in a non-conflicting
order. This results in lower memory usage, since all 100 inserted characters are605
deleted by the following 100 deletions.
Figure 6b compares the memory usage of the list and tree-based implementa-
tions using SECROs. We conclude that the tree-based implementation consumes
more memory than the list implementation because nodes of a tree maintain
pointers to their children, whereas nodes of a singly linked list only maintain a610
single pointer to the next node. Interestingly, we observe a staircase pattern.
This pattern indicates that memory usage grows when characters are inserted
(green columns) and shrinks when characters are deleted (red columns). Over-
all, memory usage increases linearly with the number of executed operations,
even though we delete the inserted characters and commit the replica after each615
operation. Hence, SECROs cause a small memory overhead for each executed
operation, as shown by the dashed regression lines.
8.4. Execution Time
In this section we discuss several aspects of the execution time of SECROs.
First, we analyse the effect of committing the SECRO’s operation history on the620
execution time of operations. Then, we compare the SECRO list implementation
of the text editor to a state-of-the-art implementation with JSON CRDTs.
8.4.1. The Effect of Commit on the Execution Time
We now present two benchmarks related to the commit operation. The first
quantifies the performance overhead of SECROs that results from reordering the625
operation history. The second illustrates the effect of commit on the execution
time of the collaborative text editor and how commit improves its performance.
To quantify the performance overhead of SECROs we measure the execution
times of 500 constant time operations, for different commit intervals. Each
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Commit Interval Infinite 100 1
(b) Time to append a character to the
text document using the list implementa-
tion of the SECRO text editor.
Figure 7: Execution time of SECROs for different commit intervals, performed on a single
worker node of the cluster. Error bands represent the 95% confidence interval for the average
taken from a minimum of 30 samples. Samples affected by garbage collection were discarded.
operation computes 10 000 tangents and has no associated pre or postcondition.630
Hence, the results reflect the best-case performance of SECROs.
Figure 7a depicts the execution time of the aforementioned constant time
operation. If we do not commit the replica (red curve), the operation’s execution
time increases linearly with the number of operations. Hence, SECROs induce
a linear overhead. This results from the fact that the replica’s operation history635
grows with every operation. Each operation requires the replica to reorganise
the history. To this end, the replica generates linear extensions of the history
until a valid ordering of the operations is found (see Algorithm 1 in Section 7.1).
Since we defined no preconditions or postconditions, every order is valid and
the replica generates exactly one linear extension and validates it. To validate640
the ordering, the replica executes each operation. Therefore, the operation’s
execution time is linear to the size of the operation history.
Note that commit implies a trade-off between concurrency and performance.
Small commit intervals lead to better performance but less concurrency, whereas
28
large commit intervals support more concurrent operations at the cost of per-645
formance. Figure 7a illustrates this trade-off. For a commit interval of 50 (blue
curve), we observe a sawtooth pattern. The operation’s execution time increases
until the replica is committed, whereafter it falls back to its initial execution
time. This is because commit clears the operation history. When choosing a
commit interval of 1 (green curve), the replica is committed after every oper-650
ation. Hence, the history contains a single operation and does not need to be
reorganised. This results in a constant execution time.
We now analyse the execution time of insert operations on the collaborative
text editor. Figure 7b shows the time it takes to append a character to a text
document in function of the document’s length, for various commit intervals. If655
we do not commit the replica (red curve), append exhibits a quadratic execution
time. This is because the SECRO induces a linear overhead and append is a
linear operation. Hence, append’s execution time becomes quadratic. For a
commit interval of 100 (blue curve) we again observe a sawtooth pattern. In
contrast to Figure 7a the peaks increase linearly with the size of the document660
because append is a linear operation. For a commit interval of 1 (green curve)
we get a linear execution time. This results from the fact that we do not need to
reorganise the replica’s history. Hence, we execute a single append operation.
From these results, we draw two conclusions. First, SECROs induce a linear
overhead on the execution time of operations. Second, commit is a practical665
solution to keep the performance of SECROs within acceptable bounds.
8.4.2. SECRO vs JSON CRDT Text Editor
We now compare the naive list implementation and the advanced tree imple-
mentation of the text editor to the JSON CRDT implementation. To this end,
we measure the time it takes to append characters to a text document. Although670
this is not a realistic edition pattern, it showcases the worst case performance.
From Figure 8a we notice that the SECRO versions exhibit quadratic perfor-
mance, whereas the JSON CRDT version exhibits linear performance. The
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(b) Execution time of an operation that
appends 100 characters to a document.
Figure 8: Execution time of character insertions in the collaborative text editors. Replicas
are never committed. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval for the average taken
from a minimum of 30 samples. Samples affected by garbage collection are discarded.
on top of the operations themselves (as explained in Section 8.4.1). Since insert675
is also a linear operation, the overall performance of the text editor’s insert
operation is quadratic. To address this performance overhead the replica needs
to be committed periodically.
Figure 8a also shows that the SECRO implementation that uses a linked
list is faster than its tree-based counterpart. To determine the cause of this680
counterintuitive observation, we measured the different parts that make up the
total execution time in Appendix D. We found that the time overhead incurred
by copying the document 13 kills the speedup we gain from organising the doc-
ument as a tree. This is because each insertion inserts only a single character
but requires the entire document to be copied.685
To validate this hypothesis, we re-execute the benchmark shown in Fig-
ure 8a but insert 100 characters per operation. Figure 8b shows the resulting
execution times. As expected, the tree implementation now outperforms the list
13Since JavaScript objects are mutable, our prototype implementation of SECROs needs to
copy the state before tentatively executing its operation history.
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implementation. This means that the speedup obtained from 100 logarithmic
insertions exceeds the copying overhead induced by the tree. In practice, this690
means that single character manipulations are too fine-grained. Manipulating
entire words, sentences or even paragraphs is more beneficial for performance.
Overall, the execution time benchmarks show that deep copying the doc-
ument induces a considerable overhead. We believe that this overhead is not
inherent to SECROs, but to its implementation on top of mutable objects.695
9. Guidelines for Designing Replicated Data Types (RDTs)
We now provide some guidelines for designing replicated data types under
(strong) eventual consistency. When designing available systems, programmers
need to use existing RDTs or design their own. If a data type’s operations
naturally commute then replicating it will guarantee strong eventual consistency700
out of the box, given that updates are eventually propagated to all replicas. This
is for instance the case of a counter data type, whose increment and decrement
operations commute.
When the data type’s operations do not naturally commute, one can browse
the literature for an equivalent CRDT. A CRDT may exist that applies some705
clever tricks to make the operations commute (e.g. OR-Sets [25]).
If none of the above applies one can resort to SECROs to build their repli-
cated data type without worrying about commutativity. SECROs are able to
omit the commutativity requirement by (re)ordering operations deterministi-
cally. This naturally entails some performance cost, as shown in Section 8.710
Note that some conflicts may not be solvable solely by reordering operations
and can thus not be tackled using SECROs. This is the case for mutually exclu-
sive operations. When two mutually exclusive operations execute concurrently,
a conflict will arise that can only be solved by discarding at least one of the
operations. In those cases, the programmer may resort to synchronising the715
mutually exclusive operations, similarly to [26, 27], or implement an ad-hoc
conflict resolution scheme.
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Finally, we draw the relation between CmRDTs (operation-based CRDTs,
see Section 2) and SECROs. Both data types ensure SEC, but CmRDTs require
all concurrent operations to commute. As such, all valid serialisations of the720
operations - those respecting causality - yield the same valid state. Interestingly,
SECROs guarantee that all replicas agree on one valid serialisation (without
having to synchronise with one another). Pre and postconditions are used to
confine the set of serialisations from which to pick one, e.g. to ensure that the
given serialisation guarantees a certain conflict resolution strategy. Since all725
serialisations of a CmRDT are equivalent, any CmRDT can be implemented as
a SECRO that associates no pre or postconditions to the operations. We thus
conclude that CmRDTs are a subset of SECROs.
10. Related Work
We now describe work that is closely related to the ideas presented in this pa-730
per. We distinguish between two research areas. First, we discuss programming
languages and abstractions that like CScript help programmers trade off con-
sistency for availability and vice-versa. Second, we discuss research on (strong)
eventual consistency that is related to the SECRO data type.
Programming Languages. CAPtain [28] is a programming model with735
two types of replicated objects: consistents and availables. The former guaran-
tee strong consistency whereas the latter guarantee availability but only even-
tual consistency. These two types of objects are completely separated and form
CAPtain’s unit of distribution. In contrast to CAPtain, CScript bundles replicas
into services which can be partly consistent and partly available, and distributes740
those services over the network. Each service exposes specific functionality
through its API by coordinating between consistent and available replicas.
Geo [29] is an actor system for geo-replication that combines caching with
replication techniques to hide latency and benefit from data locality where pos-
sible. Geo supports “single-instance” and “multi-instance” caching policies for745
actors across clusters. The single-instance caching policy is similar to consistent
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replicas in CScript, as it ensures a single instance of the actor that serialises all
updates. The multi-instance caching policy replicates the actor to every clus-
ter. These actors can be kept strongly consistent using Geo’s distributed cache
coherence protocol, or eventually consistent using Geo’s Versioned API.750
The MixT programming language [3] proposes mixed-consistency trans-
actions to manipulate data with different consistency levels within a single
database transaction. Using information flow analysis, MixT can break down
mixed-consistency transactions into subtransactions for each consistency level
and still guarantee atomicity. MixT works on top of existing databases whereas755
CScript’s programming model integrates replication at the object-level.
Lasp [14] is the first programming language where CRDTs are first-class cit-
izens. New CRDTs are defined through functional transformations over existing
ones. In contrast, CScript provides SECROs, general-purpose RDTs which are
not limited to a portfolio of builtin data types. Existing data structures can be760
turned into SECROs by associating state validators to the operations.
Eventual Consistency. Central to SECROs is the idea of using
application-specific information to reorder conflicting operations. Bayou [10]
was the first system to use application-level semantics for conflict resolution by
means of user-defined merge procedures. However, our work does not require765
manual conflict resolution; programmers instead specify the invariants the appli-
cation must uphold in the face of concurrent updates, and the underlying update
algorithm deterministically orders operations as to respect these invariants.
IPA [30] is closely related to SECROs as it preserves application invari-
ants without coordinating operations. IPA extends the operations of traditional770
CRDTs with effects that guarantee the preservation of invariants in the face of
concurrent updates. IPA differs from SECROs in that they modify operations
whereas SECROs reorder concurrent operations.
JSON CRDTs [8] ease the construction of CRDTs by hiding the commu-
tativity restriction that traditionally applies to the operations. Programmers775
can build new CRDTs by nesting lists and maps in arbitrary ways. The ma-
jor shortcoming is that nesting lists and maps does not suffice to implement
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arbitrary RDTs. Moreover, programmers cannot customise conflict resolution
because it is hardcoded by the implementation of lists and maps. Hence, JSON
CRDTs are not truly general-purpose as opposed to SECROs.780
Cloud types [5] are RDTs that like SECROs do not impose restrictions on
the operations of the data type. However, cloud types hardcode how to merge
updates coming from different replicas of the same type. As such, programmers
have no means to customise the merge procedure of cloud types to fit the appli-
cation’s semantics. Instead, they are bound to implement a new cloud type and785
the accompanying merge procedure that fits the application. Hence, conflict
resolution needs to be manually dealt with.
Some work has considered a hybrid approach offering SEC for commutative
operations, and requiring strong consistency for non-commutative ones [27, 26].
There are some similarities to SECROs as they employ application-specific in-790
variants to classify operations as safe or unsafe under concurrent execution.
These hybrid approaches synchronise unsafe operations, whereas SECROs re-
order them as to avoid conflicts without giving up on availability. Partial Order-
Restrictions (PoR) consistency [31] uses application-specific restrictions over
operations but cannot guarantee convergence nor invariant preservation since795
these properties depend on the restrictions over the operations specified by the
programmer.
11. Conclusion
In this work we propose CScript, a distributed programming language fea-
turing consistent and available replicas. Consistent replicas guarantee strong800
consistency but are not available under network partitions. On the other hand,
programmers can always execute operations on available replicas but they only
guarantee strong eventual consistency (SEC) [6]. CScript lets programmers
bundle replicas into larger components called services. Services can mix avail-
able and consistent replicas which eases the development of mixed-consistency805
applications. The CScript runtime manages all replicas automatically, thereby
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freeing the programmer from manually synchronising them.
CScript supports two types of available replicas: conflict-free replicated data
types (CRDTs) [6] and strong eventually consistent replicated objects (SE-
CROs). Several CRDTs are built-in and programmers can implement custom810
ones. When CRDTs are not applicable, programmers can use our general-
purpose SECRO data type. A SECRO is an RDT that guarantees SEC without
imposing restrictions on the data type’s operations. Upon concurrent opera-
tions, SECROs compute a global total order of the operations that is conflict-
free, without synchronising the replicas. To this end, SECROs use state val-815
idators: application-specific invariants that determine the object’s behaviour in
the face of concurrency. By specifying state validators arbitrary data types can
thus be turned into available replicas.
To the best of our knowledge, SECROs are the first approach to support truly
general-purpose RDTs while still guaranteeing SEC. In this paper, we prove820
that SECROs guarantee convergence and we formulate a necessary condition
for SECRO data types which is sufficient to then prove progress.
To evaluate our work, we implemented a collaborative text editing appli-
cation using SECROs in CScript and compared it to a state-of-the-art imple-
mentation that uses JSON CRDTs. The memory usage benchmarks reveal825
that SECROs are more memory efficient than JSON CRDTs. Time complexity
benchmarks reveal that SECROs induce a linear time overhead which is pro-
portional to the size of the operation history. Performance wise, SECROs can
be competitive to state-of-the-art solutions if committed regularly.
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A. General Proof of Convergence for SECROs
In this appendix we prove that the SECRO data type guarantees strong
convergence. In other words, we prove that SECRO replicas which received the
same updates are in equivalent states.
In what follows we consider the SECRO implementation without commits940
and can therefore simplify the representation of SECRO replicas to a tuple
r = 〈s, h〉 consisting of the replica’s initial state s and its history h.
39
Definition A1. Assume a replica r1 with initial state s1 and history h1, and
a replica r2 with initial state s2 and history h2. We say that r1 is equivalent to
r2 iff they have the same initial state and the same operation history:945
∀r1∀r2 : r1 ≡ r2 ⇐⇒ s1 = s2 ∧ h1 = h2.
We now prove convergence for the SECRO implementation without commits.
We use the notation l ⇓ r to deliver a list of updates l to a replica r which
optionally yields the updated replica. We denote the set of permutations of a
list l by Perm(l).950
Theorem A1. Replicas that received the same updates (possibly in a different
order) are in equivalent states:
∀r1, r2 ∀l1, l2 : r1 = 〈s1, h1〉 ∧ r2 = 〈s2, h2〉 ∧ s1 = s2 ∧
h1 ++ l1 ∈ Perm(h2 ++ l2) =⇒ l1 ⇓ r1 ≡ l2 ⇓ r2
Proof. When we deliver the updates l1 to the replica r1, Algorithm 1 ap-
pends the incoming updates to the history on Line 1: h′1 = h1 ++ l1. Simi-
larly, when we deliver the updates l2 to replica r2, we add the updates to the




2 are permutations of one another,





2). Both replicas then deterministically generate
the linear extensions of l on Line 3: LE(l) and search for the first extension
that is valid (i.e. respects all pre and postconditions). Given that the pre and
postconditions are deterministic, finding the first valid extension is also deter-
ministic. Hence, either both replicas find the same ordering of operations h′960
and end up in equivalent states 〈s1, h′〉 ≡ 〈s2, h′〉, or, both replicas end up in
an error state because no valid extension exists. 
B. Proof of Progress for SECROs
As argued in Section 7.2, we cannot provide a general proof of progress for
SECROs because the pre and postconditions are defined by the programmers.965
Instead, we require the SECRO’s pre and postconditions to meet Lemma 1.
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Lemma 1. Given an initial state s and a set of valid updates Vs, there exists
an ordering of the updates that respects causality and all pre and postconditions.
Using Lemma 1 we define correctness of replicas.
Definition B1. A replica r = 〈s, h〉 is correct iff the replica is an instance of970
a SECRO whose pre and postconditions meet Lemma 1 and all updates from its
history h are valid.
Given a replica r = 〈s, h〉 we can compute the replica’s current state by
successive applications of the updates from its history, denoted s / h. Listing 9
defines the generic / operator which applies a list of updates on some state, in975
Haskell. Updates are functions from state to state.
1 type Update s t a t e = s t a t e −> s t a t e
2 (/) : : s t a t e −> [ Update s t a t e ] −> s t a t e
3 s / h = fo ld l (\ s t a t e update −> update s t a t e ) s h
Listing 9: Definition of the / operator to compute a replica’s current state given its initial
state and update history.
We now prove that correct replicas guarantee progress.980
Theorem B1. For any correct replica r1 = 〈s, h1〉 and any valid update u
issued by some other correct replica r2 = 〈s, h2〉 while being in state t = s / h2,
delivering the update u at replica r1 does not fail:
∀r1, r2, u : r1 = 〈s, h1〉 ∧ r2 = 〈s, h2〉 ∧ t = s / h2 ∧
u ∈ Vt =⇒ [u] ⇓ r1 6= None
Proof. Let V be the set of valid updates observed by replica r1, i.e. V
contains all (and only those) updates from its history h1. Upon delivering the
update u at replica r1, [u] ⇓ r1, the algorithm generates all linear extensions of
the updates in V ′ = V ∪ {u} (Line 3 in Algorithm 1). Those linear extensions
are all the serializations of the updates that respect the causality of the updates.985
The algorithm then continues by searching for the first valid extension (Lines 7
to 32). Since r1 is a correct replica, at least one linear extension is valid (cf.
Lemma 1). The algorithm will find that linear extension and return the updated
41
replica on Line 28, [u] ⇓ r1 = Some r′1. Hence, delivering a valid update at a
correct replica cannot fail. 990
C. Transitive Closure of Concurrent Operations
Recall from Algorithm 1 in Section 7.1 that checking preconditions and post-
conditions requires computing the transitive closure of concurrent operations.
We now formally define the transitive closure of concurrent operations.
Definition C1. An operation m1 = (o1, p1, a1, c1, id1) happened before an op-995
eration m2 = (o2, p2, a2, c2, id2) iff the logical timestamp of m1 happened before
the logical timestamp of m2: m1 ≺ m2 ⇐⇒ c1 ≺ c2.
Definition C2. Two operations m1 and m2 are concurrent iff neither one hap-
pened before the other [32]: m1 ‖m2 ⇐⇒ m1 ⊀ m2 ∧m2 ⊀ m1.
Definition C3. We define ‖+ as the transitive closure of ‖.1000
Definition C4. The set of all operations that are transitively concurrent to an
operation m with respect to a history h is defined as: TC(m,h) = {m′ |m′ ∈
h ∧ m′ ‖+ m}.
D. Detailed Execution Time of the Text Editor
In Section 8.4.2 we found that the SECRO implementation that uses a linked1005
list is faster than its tree-based counterpart. To determine the cause of this
counterintuitive observation, we measure the different parts that make up the
total execution time:
Execution time of operations Total time spent on append operations.
Execution time of preconditions Total time spent on preconditions.1010
Execution time of postconditions Total time spent on postconditions.
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Copy time Due to the mutability of JavaScript objects our prototype imple-
mentation in CScript needs to copy the state before validating the poten-
tial history. The total time spent on copying objects (i.e. the document
state) is the copy time.1015
Figures D.9a and D.9b depict the detailed execution time for the list and tree
implementations respectively. The results show that the total execution time is
dominated by the copy time. We observe that the tree implementation spends
more time on copying the document than the list implementation. The reason
being that copying a tree entails a higher overhead than copying a linked list as1020
more pointers need to be copied. Furthermore, the tree implementation spends
considerably less time executing operations, preconditions and postconditions,
than the list implementation. This results from the fact that the balanced tree
provides logarithmic time operations.
Unfortunately, the time overhead incurred by copying the document kills the1025
speedup we gain from organising the document as a tree. This is because each
insertion inserts only a single character but requires the entire document to be
copied.
E. Throughput of the Text Editor
The experiments presented in Section 8 focused on the execution time of se-1030
quential operations on a single replica. To measure the throughput of the text
editors under high computational loads we also perform distributed benchmarks.
To this end, we use 10 replicas (one on each node of the cluster) and let them si-
multaneously perform operations on the text editor. The operations are equally
spread over the replicas. We measure the time to convergence, i.e. the time that1035
is needed for all replicas to process all operations and reach a consistent state.
Note that replicas reorder operations locally, hence, the throughput depends on
the number of operations and is independent of the number of replicas.
Figure E.10 depicts how the throughput of the list-based text editor varies
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Figure D.9: Detailed execution time for appending characters to the SECRO text editor. The
replica is never committed. The plotted execution time is the average taken from a minimum


















Comparison of the naive JSON CRDT and SECRO implementations
Throughput Of The Text Editor
Error bars represent the 95% CI.
Commit interval of 100 for the SECRO version.
Figure E.10: Throughput of the list-based SECRO and JSON CRDT text editors, in function
of the number of concurrent operations. The SECRO version committed the document replica
at a commit interval of 100. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval for the average
of 30 samples.
50 concurrent operations, at which point it reaches its maximal throughput.
Afterwards, the throughput quickly degrades. On the other hand, the JSON
CRDT implementation achieves a higher throughput than the SECRO version
under high loads (100 concurrent operations and more). Hence, the JSON
CRDT text editor scales better than the SECRO text editor. However, SECROs1045
are truly general-purpose which allowed us to organise documents as balanced
trees of characters, which is not possible using JSON CRDTs.
45
